WHAT MAKES INEQUALITIES LEGITIMATE?
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

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MEZINÁRODNÍ SROVNÁNÍ LEGITIMITY NEROVNOSTÍ: TEST ZÁKLADNÍCH HYPOTÉZ

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ABSTRAKT


KEYWORDS

legitimita; chudoba a bohatství; dominantní ideologie; konkurenční normy; sociální transformace; mezinárodní srovnání;
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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes legitimacy of poverty and wealth in six countries. In the first part various theories about perceptions of poverty and wealth are presented. Most sociologists have been elaborating the theory of dominant and challenging stratification ideology so far. This theory predicts socially universal individual explanations of inequalities and socially specific structural explanations. Based on some previous research I argue, however, that the latent structure of perceptions of poverty and wealth is more complex. Using data from International Social Justice Project I found that people distinguish between merited, unmerited and fatalistic types of poverty. Merited poverty corresponds to what researchers usually call “individualistic explanation” (e.g. loose morals, a lack of effort), unmerited poverty is due to discrimination, failure of the economic system, and lack of equal opportunities (so called structural causes), and fatalistic explanation operates with bad luck and lack of ability and talents. Moreover, people structure their explanations of wealth along three factors too. Wealth can be merited, unmerited, or based on social capital. Positive individual explanation attributes wealth to hard work, ability and good luck. Unmerited wealth is a purely negative explanation (dishonesty and failure of the economic system) and social capital sees contacts, unequal opportunities and good luck as reasons of wealth. Further, I elaborate theories about determinants of perceptions of inequalities. I show how legitimacy of inequalities depends on individual stratification-related experience, group identification and membership, education and changing social atmosphere.

KEYWORDS

legitimacy; poverty and wealth; dominant ideology; challenging beliefs; social transformation; international comparison
INTERNATIONALER VERGLEICH DER GESETZMÄSSIGKEIT DER UNGLEICHHEITEN: TEST DER GRUNDHYPOTHESEN

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ABSTRACT


SCHLÜSSELWORCHE

Gesetzmäßigkeit; Armut und Reichtum; dominante Ideologie; Konkurrenznormen; soziale Transformierung; internationaler Vergleich;
1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since people started contemplating the nature of human society, they pondered on inequalities between individuals. The common sense contemplation on stratification system involves two fundamental questions. First, people ask how the stratification system works. Second, they may ask how it should work (Form, Rytina 1961; Rytina, Form, Pease 1973; Matějů, Řeháková 1992; Kluegel, Smith 1986). On the most general level, the relationship between these two questions raises the issue of legitimacy of the inequality system. The system is perceived as legitimate only as long as answers to the above questions are identical.

This paper explores the ways in which people explain causes of economic inequalities, particularly poverty and wealth. Do they believe that wealth results from hard work and exceptional talents and effort, think that wealth follows from unequal opportunities and connections, or are convinced that wealth arises from dishonesty and failures of the economic system? Similarly, do they blame the poor for their poverty (insufficient individual effort, laziness and poor moral) rather than the society (discrimination, unequal opportunities and failure of the economic system)? Or do they think that their economic situation is a matter of good or bad luck, affected by coincidental circumstances one has no control over?

In this paper I would like to go beyond the mere description of attitudes. I intend to demonstrate to what extend are perceptions affected by stratification-related experience, educational enlightenment and changing social atmosphere. I want to ask what makes inequalities legitimate and what makes them illegitimate. Theories give different predictions regarding the social position of various ideologies and explanations of economic outcomes. According to the “dominant ideology thesis”, individual explanations are supposed to be shared virtually by all members of the society. The same may be inferred from various socio-psychological theories. Approaches stemming from self-interest would on the other hand predict individualism to increase with higher social position. Similarly to individualism, structuralism is expected to be dependent upon social position as well. Some theorists even suggest that structuralism shall be affected by stratification variables more than individualism. The situation gets even more complicated taking into account post-communist societies.

Further I am going to compare stratification and other effects across countries. My comparison will focus mainly on the differences between western and post-socialist countries, since there are many good reasons to believe that attitudes will display significant variations. So far, little of the research on reactions to inequality has been comparative, the positive exception being the book by Kluegel, Mason and Wegener (1995) working with the data set from the first wave of the Social Justice Survey conducted in 1991. The comparative approach sheds new light on many old issues- I may for instance test hypotheses out of their original cultural and historical context. Moreover, completion of the second wave of the Social Justice Survey allows making intertemporal comparisons as well.
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1. ON DEVELOPMENT OF ATTITUDES TO INEQUALITIES IN CAPITALISTIC COUNTRIES

James Kluegel and Eliot Smith (1986) state three conditions affecting attitudes to inequality in the United States: dominant stratification ideology, social experience of the individual, and the changing social atmosphere of the past decades, i.e. rising social liberalism. These three factors may affect explanations of inequalities in different ways, frequently contradicting each other.

Dominant stratification ideology represents a stable, comprehensive system of opinions about the structure of opportunities, causes of inequalities and social justice. This ideology is presumably shared by all members of society. The principle of equal opportunities and belief in responsibility of each person for his or her social position are the fundamental elements of American dominant stratification ideology (Aronowitz 1997; Feagin 1975; Huber, Form 1973; Kluegel 1987; Kluegel, Smith 1982, 1983, 1986; Lee, Jones, Lewis 1990; Nilson 1981; Rytina, Form, Pease 1970). International comparisons reveal that other Western societies have shared (Mann 1970) and continue to share a similar structure of attitudes to inequalities (Kluegel et al. 1995; Kluegel, Matějů 1995).

Dominant stratification ideology supports legitimacy of inequalities. Some authors attribute its existence to the power of ruling class that controls means of both material and mental production (cf. Abercombie, Turner 1978; Abercombie, Hill, Turner 1980). During the socialization process, family, school, media, cultural and religious institutions become agents of the ruling class and ensure legitimacy of inequalities (Cheal 1979; Kluegel, Smith 1986; Mankoff 1970; Marx 1967). In compliance with the dominant ideology, wealth is perceived as a product of one’s exceptional effort and talents while poverty is caused by a lack of the above.

Personal social experience. Dominant ideology enables to explain why the stratification system perceived as legitimate even by the disadvantaged (cf. Della Fave 1974, 1986; Ritzman, Tomaskovic-Devey 1992). Scholars working within Marxist tradition often refer to “false consciousness” of the exploited classes. According to Marx, however, there is a possibility to overcome this “false consciousness” (Marx 1967). For instance a negative personal social experience may lead workers to reject the dominant ideology and a new, usually egalitarian ideology may replace it. Economic insecurity, uncertain job, unemployment, low wages, etc. indeed increase class consciousness and militant attitudes of workers and affect political attitudes and behavior (Kreidl, Vlachová 2000; Legget 1964; Street, Legget 1961; Večerník 1995; Zeitlin 1966). Under such circumstances there are two alternative explanations of economic outcomes and people are supposed to choose either the structural or individual one.

Dominant stratification hypothesis has been criticized from numerous perspectives. Abercombie and his colleagues (Abercombie, Turner 1978; Abercombie, Hall, Turner 1980) refuse to believe that the “dominant” ideology could indeed be so deeply rooted in the society. First they assert that there is a strong disagreement between social classes about the presumably dominant values. Second they find the elite effort to promote justification beliefs rather unsuccessful and claim that stability of the stratification
system is not, they say, based on indoctrination of disadvantaged classes by the elite’s ideology.

Other authors claim that dominant stratification ideology does not have to and cannot be a result of the elite’s influence on important socialization institutions because it is hard to imagine that the vast number of socialization institutions could be subject to absolute control. An elaboration of socio-psychological processes made by Kluegel and Smith (1986) also undermines the notion that the dominant ideology is an intentional product of social intervention of elites. Kluegel and Smith stated that “a number of processes at the social- psychological level operate directly to bring about or strengthen support for the dominant ideology”. Thus it ”may not be necessary to postulate its dissemination [...] by the elite who dominate important societal institutions“ (Kluegel, Smith 1986: 25).

Dominant ideology involves acceptation of individual explanations of poverty and wealth and rejection of social ones. Challenging ideology turns the approach upside down: people should accept social explanations of inequalities while rejecting individual ones. The key question of the research on stratification system perceptions and social justice used to be “do people explain inequalities in individual or rather in structural terms?” Subsequent research however showed that many people had unclear or inconsistent opinions that correspond to neither of the ideologies (Kluegel, Smith 1986; Kluegel, Mason, Wegener 1995; Kreidl 1998; Lee, Jones, Lewis 1990; Matějů, Řeháková 1992; Matějů, Vlachová 2000).

There was a clear discrepancy between the theoretical approach and empirical evidence. Split-consciousness theory (Cheal 1979; Senett; Cobb 1973) assumes that different attitudes can co-exist in people’s minds. New social experience and/or acceptation of a new attitude do not necessarily lead to rejection of the old ones. Opinions based on the dominant ideology and challenging beliefs based on personal stratification-related experience may be in Lane’s terms ”compartmentalized” (Lane 1962) and people may hardly confront them in their consciousness.

In empirical research, the split-consciousness theory assumes that attitudes to inequalities are structured along two factors (individual and structural). Both these factors should be virtually uncorrelated. On the other hand, theory of “dominant ideology” and “false consciousness theory” assume that individual and structural perceptions of inequalities are organized along one factor. One-factor solution assumes that either the structural or individual explanation have to be accepted. On the contrary, the two-factor solution means that accepting the structural explanation does not lead to rejection of the individual one and vice versa.

2.2. INDIVIDUAL, STRUCTURE AND ANYTHING ELSE?

Kluegel and his colleagues (Kluegel et al 1995) find the pattern of attitudes to inequalities more complex than the simple dichotomy (individual versus structure) suggests. Their results show that positive individualist explanations of wealth (hard work, ability) and negative individualist explanations of poverty (lack of effort, loose morals) are elements of the dominant ideology. Social explanations of poverty (lack of equal opportunity, failure of the economic system), social explanations of wealth
(unequal opportunities, connections and a bad economic system) and negative individualist explanations of wealth (dishonesty, corruption) then represent challenging beliefs.

Kreidl (1998) suggests six explanatory principles rather than the five above factors. He demonstrates that people distinguish between merited, unmerited and fatalistic types of poverty. The merited poverty corresponds to the negative individualistic explanation (i.e. loose morals, a lack of effort and surprisingly enough discrimination1), unmerited poverty complies with the system explanation (discrimination, failure of the economic system and a lack of equal opportunities), and fatalistic poverty reflects popularized version of the culture of poverty and belief in the relevance of innate abilities (bad luck and a lack of ability and talents). The perception of wealth differs from the one suggested by Kluegel et al. Wealth can be merited, unmerited or based on social capital. Merited wealth corresponds to positive individual explanation (hard work, ability and good luck), unmerited wealth complies with the negative explanation (dishonesty and failure of the economic system) and social capital reflects contacts, unequal opportunities and good luck2.

Kreidl (1998) also shows more complex relationships between the perceived factors. A second-order factor analysis describes not only primary factors but also their more profound relationships. The merited poverty and merited wealth factors combine into a deserved inequalities factor. Similarly, the unmerited poverty and unmerited wealth load on an undeserved inequalities factor. In theory, this factor of individual explanation of inequalities should be a part of the dominant ideology in Western society. System explanation of inequalities is a part of the challenging ideology. In the analyses Kreidl shows neither a relationship between social structure and fatalistic poverty nor one between the social structure and wealth attributed to social capital.

2.3. ATTITUDES TO INEQUALITIES IN POST-COMMunist COUNTRIES

Sociological theory offers no consistent predictions of attitudes to inequalities in former communist societies. Socio-psychological theory, for example, considers individualistic explanations of poverty and wealth a psychological constant of human consciousness (Della Fave 1980, 1986; Kluegel, Smith 1986). It should then follow that the individualistic concept of inequalities should be widespread and accepted in capitalistic as well as (post-) communist societies.

Dominant stratification ideology suggests a different structure of attitudes in communist societies. At the beginning of the totalitarian regime, political leaders used a

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1 It has been reported that discrimination might have different meanings for people living in distinct cultural contexts (Kluegel et al. 1995). The results presented by Kreidl (1998) might thus be biased due to some singularities of the Czech society. We may speculate that discrimination loading on the same factor as lack of ability and loose morals reflects the attitude of the Czech white majority towards the Gypsy minority: Gypsies are often said to be lazy and lacking effort. Consequently discrimination against them (in terms of giving no jobs to them) might be seen as adequate, since their "unemployability" is a well known fact.

2 Good luck plays a complex role in explaining causes of inequalities. Not only people born with exceptional abilities and talents but also those who had better opportunities when they were young due to the environment they are from are said to have good luck.
radical egalitarian ideology to support the revolution. Wealth was explained as an outcome of working class exploitation. Moreover, communist ideologists also blamed the wealthy for misfortunes of the poor (Wesolowski, Wnuk-Lipskii 1992). The old pre-communist elite disappeared and were expropriated in the new system. The new regime also adopted measures that intended to affect positively the previously disadvantaged classes. The revolution was gaining legitimacy by upward collective mobility of workers and peasants and downward collective mobility of the old elite (Wesolowski, Mach 1986a, 1986b).

The nationalization of the economy and leveled wages gradually appeared socially dysfunctional, however (cf. Connor 1979; Večerník 1969, 1996b). Some officials of the communist regime (for example, reform communist involved in the Prague Spring of 1968 – Connor 1979), therefore, started fighting egalitarianism at least in a formal manner (cf. Machonin, Tuček 1996: 16). This led to a specific socialist version of meritocratic ideology: “To each according to his/her functional usefulness to the system”. However, many agree that the communist leaders promoted this ideology only verbally, failing to implement it in reality (Wesolowski, Wnuk-Lipskii 1992; Machonin, Tuček 1996; Matějů, Vlachová 1995). Egalitarianism is thus supposed to be the dominant ideology of communism (Kluegel, Matějů 1995; Matějů 1997; Mareš 1999; Možný 1994; Možný, Mareš 1995; Večerník 1996a).

The official vocabulary of the communist ideology included neither poverty nor wealth, since the communist society was supposed to be classless. Immediately after seizing the power, communists adopted a number of measures that were supposed to ensure equal opportunities (cf. Gerber, Hout 1995, Hanley, McKeever 1997; Heynes, Bialecki 1993; Matějů 1990, 1993; Nieuwbeerta, Rijken 1996; Simkus, Andorka 1982; Szelenyi, Aschaffenburg 1993; Sin Kwo- Wong 1998) and poverty elimination (Večerník 1991, 1996b; Rabušic, Mareš 1996). In contrast to empirical studies, socialist ideology left no room for poverty. Rare cases of poverty were supposed to be due to a negative personal attitude of the poor (drunkenness, poor attitude to work, etc.) Higher income and wealth were not legitimate either. Ownership of capital was eliminated and ownership of property drastically reduced (Večerník 1996a). Rare cases of wealth were again explained in negative terms (dishonesty, corruption, etc.) The regime also created an image of dissidents living in luxurious conditions due to money provided by Western espionage centers (Možný 1991: 27).

The changes after 1989 also led to a fundamental change in the relationship of poverty and wealth. Central and Eastern European countries experienced extensive privatization and restitutions. From the point of view of dominant stratification ideology, the post-communist elites should keep supporting the individualistic explanation of poverty. On the other hand, elite should support new wealth and its legitimacy as it was supposed to bring about economic rationality and economic growth. The success of the post-communist elite in creating a new dominant ideology remains questionable, however. A research on social justice in 1991 showed that negative factors exceeded positive ones in wealth perception (Kluegel et al. 1995). Večerník (1996a) offers similar results based on data from other research projects. According to the theory of dominant ideology, however, the individualistic explanation of inequalities should be strengthening in post-communist countries.
Post-communist social experience should significantly support system explanation of inequalities. According to the split-consciousness theory, rising unemployment, decreasing real incomes, rising objective as well as subjective poverty, relative deprivation and rising downward mobility (Della Fave 1974; Kluegel 1987; Kreidl 1999; Rabušic, Mareš 1996; Matějů 1999a; Řeháková, Vlachová 1995; Szirmai 1986; Robinson, Bell 1978) should strengthen egalitarianism and social explanation of poverty in spite of the dominant ideology.

2.4. DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TO INEQUALITIES

The following sub-chapter shows theoretical background of relationship between various explanations of poverty and wealth and individual’s position in the stratification system. In Western countries, the difference between the dominant ideology (individual explanation) and challenging beliefs (structural explanation) is due to their different social positions. While socio-psychological processes supporting dominant attitudes and indoctrination effect of the dominant ideology work on an universal basis (cf. Della Fave 1980; Kluegel, Smith 1986), social experience leading to the challenging beliefs is specific in social terms.

In post-communist societies, attitudes are not unequivocally determined by social position. As far as attitudes to poverty are concerned, the social explanation should be the challenging one and should thus predominantly depend on the stratification position. On the other hand, according to the dominant ideology the individual explanation of wealth should be the challenging one and should thus depend on the stratification position. Both the above stated hypotheses hold particularly for the period immediately following 1989.

Classic approach derives stronger inclination to challenging opinions from three hypotheses: underdog hypothesis, enlightenment hypothesis and Zeitgeist hypothesis (Robinson, Bell 1978; Szirmai 1986).

2.4.1. Underdog hypothesis

According to the underdog hypothesis, inclination to structural explanation of inequalities combines with a lower social status. Being female, having lower income or experiencing long periods of unemployment might thus result in increases in structural explanations of economic outcomes (Kluegel 1987; Kluegel, Smith 1986). The inclination of individuals with a higher social status to refuse challenging beliefs is determined not only by different stratification related experience but also by distinct self-interest. People with high positions in the social hierarchy are interested in maintaining the status quo from which they benefit. Logically, they are not interested in decreasing legitimacy of inequalities.

A number of research papers (Legget 1964; Street, Legget 1961; Zeitlin 1966) claim that the economic insecurity and an inferior position on the labor market increase class awareness of workers. However, establishing and spreading challenging beliefs may be affected not only by the position on the labor market but also by identification with a group members of which believe they are discriminated against or exploited (Form,
There are two aspects of this group effect. First the individual may follow interests of a group with which he or she identifies. Second, group membership brings about new norms and values (Kluegel, Smith 1986). African-Americans (Della Fave 1974), workers and union members (Legget 1964; Robinson, Bell 1978; Street, Legget 1961; Zeitlin 1966), members and supporters of left-oriented parties (Kreidl 1998; Robinson, Bell 1978; Szirmai 1986) are some of the examples of such influential socialization groups.

While there usually is a correlation between objective and subjective statuses, these two kinds of social hierarchies are usually not identical (Kluegel, Singleton a Starnes 1977; Hodge, Treiman 1968; Jackman, Jackman 1973). Therefore, I find it necessary to include not only the objective but also subjective statuses in the analysis. The experience from the United States shows that to some extent the subjective social status reflects and is affected by individual’s position on the “objective“ social scales (for example, income and prestige) (Robinson, Bell 1978). However, the relationship between the objective and subjective stratification varies in different stages of development of the society. This fact appears to be relevant particularly in post-communist countries. For example, an analysis of development of status inconsistency in the Czech Republic showed that while the subjective status increasingly reflected objective stratification variables from 1991 till 1995, this relationship has recently become weaker. Furthermore, subjective status played an intermediating role in the relationship between social structure and political behavior, as was the case also in the United States. However, this relationship is again limited and variation of the subjective status cannot be fully expressed in terms of objective stratification scales (Matějů, Kreidl 1999, 2000).

Attitudes to inequalities are affected by absolute as well as relative deprivation (Della Fave 1974; Robinson, Bell 1978). When modeling attitudes to inequalities, Adam Szirmai applied two somewhat different concepts of relative deprivation. The first concept defines relative deprivation as a contradiction between what one has and thinks one should have. The second concept of relative deprivation is based on a comparison of what one has to what other people have (1986). Nevertheless, the fact that relative deprivation adversely affects legitimacy of inequalities should hold in both cases.

Social mobility significantly affects attitudes to inequalities. People that have experienced upward social mobility tend to attribute their success to own effort and abilities (Kluegel, Smith 1986). By generalization, these people can conclude that everybody deserves his/her social status and is responsible for his/her achievement. Upward social mobility thus strengthens individual explanations. Research in post-communist countries of Central Europe showed, however, that the ratio of upward and downward social mobility significantly decreased since 1989. Therefore, the legitimizing effect of social mobility on inequalities must have decreased. In the United States, the long-run ratio of upward to downward mobility has been approximately 2:1 (Featherman, Hauser 1978). In the Czech Republic, however, downward mobility exceeded upward mobility from 1989 till 1993 even though upward mobility exceeded downward one from 1983 till 1988 by a ratio of 1.63:1. Similarly, in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia the ratios of upward and downward intragenerational mobility decreased
2. Theoretical perspectives

Subjective mobility followed the same pattern after the fall of communism. From 1988 till 1993, 13.3% of the economically-active in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia experienced a significant deterioration of their social status (30.8% experienced deterioration) while only 2.7% experienced a significant improvement (13.5% experienced an improvement). 13.2% and 32% experienced a significant deterioration and deterioration in income, respectively while only 11.5% felt their incomes improved (2.1% experienced a significant improvement) (Matějů 1999a). With regards to the above data, the subjective inter-generation mobility could not legitimate inequalities as much as it does in stabilized Western societies.

2.4.2. Enlightenment effects

Robinson and Bell (1978) as well as Szirmai (1986) assumed that the higher the education one has completed the stronger one's devotion to equality as a positive value. If education is to increase egalitarianism, I can, by the same token, examine whether education is going to lead to structural explanations of inequalities, particularly poverty. Education for example exposes people to information showing that inequality is not only due to individual reasons but to structural ones as well. Similarly, the higher the education, the more one tends to use media during the life course. Media usage further increases the chances to receive information on unequal opportunities and different ways of discrimination (Kluegel, Smith 1986: 26).

Indirect exposure to problems such as homelessness may reduce one’s belief in individual causes of the problems. A research carried out in Nashville, Tennessee for example showed that those who have attended any form of public presentation of the problem were less likely to believe that the homeless are to blame for their situation. People then tended to believe that the homelessness results from structural changes in the economy and insufficient opportunities to find adequate housing. This attitude implied more attention paid to the homeless within the community and support for increasing taxes that would allow for offering support and finding housing to the homeless (Lee, Jones, Lewis 1990: 259, 261).

2.4.3. Zeitgeist effect on attitudes to inequalities

Hypothesis on the changing Zeitgeist states that attitudes to inequalities are affected by their decreasing legitimacy. Legal racial segregation was eliminated, racial prejudices were reduced, participation of women on the labor market increased and general awareness about poverty and its causes in modern societies increased as well (Firebaugh, Davis 1998; Kluegel, Smith 1986; Robinson, Bell 1978; Szirmai 1986; Togeby 1994). Parallel to the awareness about unequal opportunities, welfare state develops, resources are redistributed in society, and minimal living standards are established. Social groups that have been put at a disadvantage are thus compensated though redistribution organized in different ways. Especially poverty has become a key topic in sociology and economics but in broader public discourse as well.
Values and attitudes of each person reflect dominant values of the person’s socialization period. When exploring the relationship between age and attitudes to inequalities, I should carefully distinguish between effects of age and generation. The generation effect is influenced by Zeitgeist of the period in which one experienced the socialization process, particularly a political socialization. The age effect refers to life cycle and related social status and attitudes.

The generation effect should be determined primarily by a long-term trend development of modern societies, i.e. development of the Zeitgeist. Younger generations should tend to be more liberal (left-oriented) whereas older people should have conservative attitudes (Robinson, Bell 1978). This means that the individual explanation of inequalities should prevail among older people while younger people should be more inclined towards structural explanations. The generation effect regarding structural and fatalistic explanation of poverty and explanation of wealth through social capital should be particularly significant. This shift seems to be due to terms such as “culture of poverty” and “social capital“ becoming popular in the recent public discourse.

However, Zeitgeist of the younger generation is not always necessarily more liberal (left-oriented). An opposite short run tendency may prevail over the long-term trend in social atmosphere. Post-communist countries shortly after the collapse of the communist regime appear to be one of these exceptions as the temporary rise in individualism might have been an excessive reaction to the previous collectivist regime. In the Czech Republic, for example, the youngest generations that did not gain voting rights until after November 1989 tended to support right-wing liberal-conservative and extremist parties much more than older people (Kreidl, Vlachová 2000). Preferences of this generation for right-oriented parties appear to have lasted only until 1996 when voting behavior of young people came to resemble the general population (ibid.).

The generation effect may, but does not have to, comply with the life-cycle effect (Harrop, Miller 1987). In Western countries, the conservative attitude of older people is supported by their traditional attitude and their support for values of the past periods. The life-cycle effect in post-communist countries however offers an opposite interpretation. In post-communist countries, conservative values of older people should lead to a continuing support for socialistic values of equality (cf. Řeháková 1997).

Social status is also directly related to age. Younger people tend to have less secure positions on the labor market that may improve as they gain experience. Therefore, I could explain the left-oriented (liberal) attitudes of the youngest generation as their self-interest. The situation in post-communist countries is again different. The first phase of the post-communist transformation brought about a declining standard of living and rising poverty. However, older people found it more difficult to find a well-paid job, retrain, learn foreign languages and fit in the world of computers that emerged after the fall of communism. Channels of upward social mobility were much narrower for older people in the new regime. Řeháková and Vlachová showed that in Central and Eastern Europe it was the young people who most often experienced an upward subjective social mobility after 1989 (Řeháková, Vlachová 1995) even though they often faced a risk of unemployment. It should come as no surprise that in post-communist societies, older people showed a stronger tendency to explain inequalities in system or fatalistic
ways. On the other hand, improved social status and bright prospects of young people may result in their stronger individualistic tendencies.
3. ANALYSIS

3.1. DATA AND VARIABLES

The following analysis is based on a pooled data file from the international project Social Justice carried out in 1991 and repeated in some countries in 1996\(^3\). The character of the project allows not only for comparing perceptions of poverty and wealth in several countries but also focusing on development in post-communist countries. Even though a number of sociologists and economists are involved in research of inequalities throughout the transformation, there is not much information on trends in attitudes to inequalities and opinions on causes of poverty and wealth. The following analysis allows us to describe basic changes in legitimacy of inequalities in the post-communist period.

Six selected countries that participated in the Social Justice project were analyzed (Germany, the Netherlands, USA, Russia, Hungary, and Czech Republic). Data from the three Eastern European countries were available for 1991 as well as 1996, so I have 9 subsamples to analyze. Moreover, I use Czech data from ISSP 1998 – Social inequalities and justice for the descriptive analyses. For Western countries I used data from the first survey in 1991. Perceptions of causes of poverty and wealth were measured by 2 x 7 items. The respondents were asked the following question: "In your view, how often is each of the following factors a reason why there are rich/poor people in [country] today?" They were asked to indicate the importance of each item using a five-point scale. The original categories were recoded so that in the analysis 5 means "very often", 4 “often”, 3 “sometimes”, 2 “rarely”, 1 “never”. The factors offered in case of poverty were: “lack of ability or talent”, “bad luck”, “lack of effort by the poor themselves”, “loose morals and drunkenness”, “prejudice and discrimination against certain groups”, “lack of equal opportunity”, “failure of the economic system”. Wealth items were the following: “ability or talent”, “luck”, “dishonesty”, “hard work”, “having the right connections”, “more opportunities to begin with”, and an “economic system which allows to take unfair advantage”.

The above variables will be used in a descriptive analysis and an analysis of internal structure of attitudes to inequalities. I also use regression analysis to determine the effect of different variables on the perceptions of poverty and wealth. Following are the explanatory variables: gender coded in all cases 1- men, 2- women; age in years; total household income standardized in each country as a z-score variable. I measured unemployment by a continual variable giving the total amount of time in months that the respondent spent unemployed;\(^4\) education is coded into seven CASMIN categories and used as an interval variable. Further I include subjective social status of the

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\(^3\) For more details on the Survey, please, see the web site of the project (www.butler.edu/isjp). Data from the Social Justice Project are available also from the Sociological Data Archive in Prague (http://archiv.soc.cas.cz). The 1998 data come from the 1998 Czech ISSP module. More information on the survey can be obtained from the Sociological Data Archive as well.

\(^4\) This question may not be included in the analysis of Hungary (1996) where we did not ask the question and Russia (1991) where the question included too many missing values and would cause the entire analysis to collapse.
respondent (with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest);\textsuperscript{5} subjective political orientation of the respondent on a ten-item scale; \textsuperscript{6} relative deprivation (comparison of the actual income of the respondent's households to a subjective need (5- has much less than needed, 4- has less than needed, 3- has just about what is needed, 2- has more than needed, and 1- has much more than needed)).\textsuperscript{7} Finally, I measure the belief that people have equal opportunities for achievement in respondent's country (1- strongly disagree, 2 -somewhat disagree, 3- neither agree nor disagree, 4 -somewhat agree, 5- strongly agree)\textsuperscript{8}.

In all cases, I limited the analysis to economically active respondents, which gives us an opportunity to assess the effect of stratification variables related to the position on the labor market. In multivariate analyses only respondents that have answered all questions are included.

3.2. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ATTITUDES

Table 1 offers a basic idea about preferences for individual causes of poverty and wealth in the countries subject to research. Figures in the table show cumulative frequencies for two categories of agreement that the phenomenon in question causes poverty. At a first glance, there is a major division line splitting the societies into Eastern (post-communist) and Western ones. The most significant differences in the perception of wealth appeared in variables "system", "dishonesty", "ability" and "hard work". 71\% to 83\% of people in the post-communist societies believed that wealth is accumulated in a dishonest manner while only between 26\% and 41\% of people agreed with the statement in Western countries. Similarly, 55\% to 86\% of people in post-communist societies relate wealth to a failure of the economic system, while the percentage does not exceed 38\% in the Western countries. People in Western societies tended to emphasize individual causes of wealth. Items involving abilities and hard work were chosen by more respondents than in Central and Eastern Europe. However, there were hardly any differences between Western and Eastern societies regarding variables “connections” and “unequal opportunity”. The first one received high preferences in all countries ranging from 74\% in the Netherlands to 89\% in Russia. The second variable was less preferred, ranging from 46\% in the Czech Republic 1991 to 79\% in Hungary in 1996.

\textsuperscript{5} Question: "In COUNTRY today, some people are considered to have a high social standing and some are considered to have a low social standing. Thinking about yourself, where would you place yourself on this scale if the top box indicated high social standing in this country and the bottom box indicated low social standing.?”

\textsuperscript{6} Question: "Some people use the terms "left" and "right" when talking about politics. Here is a scale running from left to right. Thinking about your own political views, please indicate where you would place yourself on this scale by putting a cross in the appropriate box.” (Political orientation was not asked in Russia in 1996).

\textsuperscript{7} Question:"Would you say your total (household) income is much less than you need, somewhat less than you need, about what you need, somewhat more than you need, or much more than you need?” The original categories of this variable were recoded into the form given in text.

\textsuperscript{8} Statement: "In COUNTRY, people have equal opportunities to get ahead.” The original coding of this variable was recoded into the values introduced in the text.
With regards to the dominant ideology, I have to conclude that even though preferences for individual explanations of wealth are higher in the Western countries than in Eastern ones, contacts, cronyism and unequal opportunities are considered the most frequented causes of wealth even in the West. However, wealth is still perceived more positively in Western countries, particularly due to low preferences of items such as dishonesty and failures of the economic system. Since connections, as we have seen, are partly individual attributes, it is possible to confirm that individual causes of wealth prevail in Western countries. However, on the theoretical level connections are not supposed to be a part of the dominant ideology.

Table 1 Perceptions of poverty and wealth- percentage distributions (% of “strongly agree” + “agree” responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>Hard Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 91</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 96</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 91</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 96</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 91</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 96</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 98</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21
The negative perception of wealth I discovered in Central and Eastern European countries did not improve too much after 1991. In the mid-1990s, wealth was mainly attributed to contacts, dishonesty, unequal opportunities and poor economic system. In this respect, population of Central and Eastern Europe maintained a negative perception of wealth even after the fall of communism. In fact, the percentage of those who believe that wealth is achieved through contacts increased in Hungary by 14% (from 74% to 88%). The same holds for unequal opportunities. Percentages increased by 12% in the Czech Republic (up to 58% in 1996 and 61% in 1998) and 10% in Hungary (up to 79% in 1996). However, there are contradictory trends observed in post-communist countries. In addition to the above negative trends, the public started associating wealth with abilities and hard work. Preferences of abilities increased by 11% in the Czech Republic up to 61% in 1996 and then decreased to 48% in 1998. Hard work went up by 17% in Russia (to 40%) and 12% in the Czech Republic (to 46% in 1998). Perceived importance of good luck in accumulating wealth also significantly increased. The percentage went up by 24% in the Czech Republic (to 39% in 1998) and 14% in Russia (to 43% in 1996).

The first glance at causes of poverty in Western countries does not reveal any pre-dominant ideology. Neither individual, system nor fatalistic explanations prevail. Bad luck is a rarely stated cause of poverty. However, agreement with other items spans over a rather small range: from 29% (“ability”) to 38% (“moral”) in Western Germany, from 27% (“discrimination”) to 33% (“effort”) in the Netherlands, and from 32% (“opportunity”) to 50% (“effort”) in the United States. The United States are the only country to show slightly higher preferences for individual causes.

Even though individual causes are not so balanced in Central and Eastern Europe, there is no pre-dominant ideology there either. Two most frequently stated causes of poverty are bad system (93% in Russia in 1991 and 75% in Hungary both in 1991 and 1996) and poor moral of the poor (from 60% to 81%). The Czech Republic was the only country in which individual causes prevailed over the structural and fatalistic ones. Structural causes, particularly the poor system, actually declined from 1991 till 1996. Legitimacy of poverty thus appeared relatively high and kept rising in the Czech Republic. However, this trend was reversed between 1996 and 1998. Poverty in Russia faced a negative trend. Preferences for structural causes increased while poverty kept loosing its legitimacy.

### 3.3. FACTOR STRUCTURE

The first part of the analysis will explore the internal structure of perceptions of poverty and wealth. The basic question I need to answer relates to the split-consciousness theory. Is it possible to rank all items on a single factor or is the multiple-factor solution preferable? Tables 2 and 3 offer a basic answer. Going left to right, these tables show a single-factor and multiple-factor solutions of confirmatory factor
analyses\(^9\). Statistics of fit for the single-factor solution show that this solution is not acceptable in any of these countries. In models measuring poverty causes, the chi square values with 14 degrees of freedom range from 85 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 275 (Germany). Values of the goodness of fit index (GFI) range from 0.88 (Russia in 1996) to 0.94 (Russia in 1991, Czech Republic in 1991 and the United States). A confirmatory factor analysis of causes of wealth also returns unsatisfactory results with a single factor. Chi square with 9 degrees of freedom\(^{10}\) ranged from 76 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 296 (the Netherlands). GFI values ranged from 0.90 (Russia in 1996) to 0.95 (Hungary 1991).

### Table 2 Causes of wealth- confirmatory factor analyses, statistics of fit of the models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One factor</th>
<th>Two factors</th>
<th>Three factors</th>
<th>three factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chi square</td>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>chi square</td>
<td>GFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 91</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 96</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 91</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 96</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 91</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 96</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degrees of freedom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison to the single-factor solution, the two-factor solution of the causes of poverty appeared to be a better alternative. The 2-factor model used “ability”, “luck”, “effort” and “moral” variables as indicators of the individual factor and “discrimination”, “opportunity” and “system” as indicators of the system factor. Table 3 shows that this modification led to a significant improvement of quality of the model in all countries, except for the Netherlands. Chi square values (with 13 degrees of freedom) ranged from 46 (Hungary in 1991) to 243 (the Netherlands). GFI values

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\(^9\) All of the presented models were estimated using the LISREL software. The author will be more than happy to provide you input files and correlation matrices for the analysis to be reproduced.

\(^{10}\) In models of causes of wealth, I included six rather than original seven variables. I had to omit the WLUCK variable in the analysis as it was causing instability of the models.
ranged from 0.92 (the Netherlands) to 0.97 (Germany, Hungary in 1991 and Russia in 1991).
Table 3 Causes of poverty- confirmatory factor analyses, statistics of fit of the models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One factor</th>
<th>Two factors</th>
<th>Three factors</th>
<th>three factors- multisample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chi square</td>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>chi square</td>
<td>GFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 91</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 96</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 91</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 96</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 91</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 96</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degrees of freedom</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In model measuring causes of wealth, I used “ability” and “hard work” as indicators of the individual factor and “connections”, “unequal opportunity”, “dishonesty” and “system” as indicators of the system factor. At first sight, the variable “dishonesty” should intuitively be a part of the individual factor. However, when testing this alternative it turned out that such an approach did not offer any acceptable solution. These models were frequently unstable and it was impossible to estimate their parameters (as in Germany, USA, Russia in 1991, Russia in 1996 and Hungary in 1991). In other countries they achieved a fit much inferior to the fit of models in which “dishonesty” was an indicator of the structural factor (the value of chi-square approximately doubled with the same number of degrees of freedom, for chi-square values see Table 2). Two-factor solution with the “dishonesty” variable as a part of the structural factor led to a significant improvement of the model in comparison to the single-factor solution (see table 2). Chi square values (df = 8) ranged from 26 (Hungary in 1996) to 130 (Russia in 1996) while the GFI values ranged from 0.94 (Russia in 1996) to 0.98 (Hungary in 1996).

In the theoretical section I mentioned that perceptions of poverty and wealth may be structured along three rather than two factors. This reflects results of some previous analyses that showed that in addition to individual and structural poverty people recognize fatalistic poverty. A person that has bad luck and is born with no talents and/or as a member of a racial or another disadvantaged minority is more likely to experience poverty than other people are. People believe that a worse endowed person is less likely to succeed on the labor market and members of a minority group are more likely to be discriminated against. Similarly, people sometimes admit that wealth may
be accumulated due to contacts and unequal opportunities rather than individual merits or system characteristics.

To test the hypothesis that causes of poverty and wealth are structured on the basis of three independent factors, I designed a number of models. In the end, I employed wealth-related variables “connections” and “unequal opportunities” as indicators of the social capital factor, variables “dishonesty” and “system” as “system allows for an unfair wealth” factor, and variables “ability”, “hard work” and “connections” as indicators of individual wealth factor. Variable “connections” loads both on the factor of social capital and on the factor of individual wealth. This may suggest that people acknowledge a double status of connections. First, good personal contacts may be a matter of being born in the right social strata, which is a matter of good or bad luck, or created and nurtured, thus becoming an individual capital.

The three-factor solution described above led to a number of statistically very robust models. Table 2 shows that chi square of the model (df = 5) ranged from 7 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 50 (Germany) with the average value of all nine sub-samples reaching 20. GFI values ranged from 0.98 (Germany) to 1.00 (the Netherlands and Russia in 1991). All of these models may be further significantly improved by freeing off-diagonal terms in the theta matrix. Even only one freed correlation improves the GFI value to 1.00 in all countries and decreases the ratio of chi square and degrees of freedom to the interval (0.5; 2).

Models of poverty causes specify variables “moral” and “effort” as indicators of the individual factor, “luck” and “discrimination” as indicators of the fatalistic poverty factor, and “discrimination”, “opportunity” and “system” as indicators of structural poverty. Table 3 shows that 3-factor solution is significantly better than 2-factor one. Chi-square with 9 degrees of freedom improved to a range from 15 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 44 (Germany). Only in the Unites States, it was impossible to estimate a stable model that would maintain a factor structure identical to the one in other countries. However, the model stabilized either by freeing some off-diagonal thetas epsilon or later by specifying a multisample model with invariant factor loadings.

Building multisample models with invariant factor loadings (see tables 2, 3 and also table 4) was the last step in the LISREL analysis. It was of special concern for two reasons: multisample makes enables the calculation of standardized parameters and it also enables to fix factor loadings to be invariant across countries. Consequently I can compare coefficients across countries. I can also compute factor scores regression and calculate the values of the latent factors with invariant pattern of factor loadings. Estimated values of all six latent factors are used as dependent variables in a series of regression analyses later.

Table 4 shows correlation coefficients between latent factors. The relation between individual and structural factors is of most relevance here, since it may answer the key question of the split consciousness theory. Our results, however, don’t give a full support to it. Correlations observed in both panels of table 4 reveal that there are relatively strong relationships between individual and structural explanations of poverty and wealth. The correlations between individual and structural explanations of poverty range between 0.07 and 0.36 (in absolute values), sometimes being positive and sometimes being negative. The correlation reached its highest negative values in the
western countries, exceeding the level of -0.3 in all of them. The highest negative value found in the East is -0.17 in the Czech Republic (in 1996), while in other countries it was near zero, or even positive. The independence of individual and social explanations is even less supported by the perceptions of wealth. Correlations between these two factors are very high, oscillating between -0.20 and -0.65. It thus cannot be inferred that individualist and structural explanations are independent, since in fact they represent rather alternatives to each other.

### Table 4 Confirmatory factor analysis- Pearson’s correlation coefficients between latent variables, common metric standardized solution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual – Soc. capital</td>
<td>Individual – System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 91</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 96</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 91</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 96</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 91</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech 96</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of standardization, correlation coefficients are not necessarily within the <-1,1> range.

I conclude that individualist and social explanations are not independent to the degree predicted by the split consciousness theory. The theory can not be verified in its narrow sense. Nevertheless, if we turn our attention to other correlations in table 4, we see it is by no means irrelevant. Correlations between individual and social capital factors (first column in table 4) and between fatalistic and structural factors (last column in table 4) are with little exceptions around zero, and so are correlations between individualist and structural factors in post-communist countries. The independence of these factors in fact show there is some true point in split consciousness theory. However it doesn’t apply where it was most expected- in case of the individualist and social explanations.
Table 5  Perceptions of wealth and poverty- structure of factor loadings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Social Capital</th>
<th>System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wealth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Work</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connections</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal Opportunity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishonesty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Luck</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal Opportunity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multisample models, factor loadings defined as invariant across subsamples.

3.4. WHAT IS BEYOND ATTITUDES

3.4.1. Wealth

Sub-chapter 2.2 discussed the fact that both perceptions of poverty and wealth are structured along three rather independent dimensions: individual, structural and fatalistic poverty, and wealth determined by individual characteristics, system and social capital. This sub-chapter focuses on explaining attitudes to causes of poverty and wealth. Latent factors structuring the perception of poverty and wealth will be used in a regression models as dependent variables. Independent variables discussed in sub-chapter 1.5 are used as explanatory variables.

I was first interested in percentages of explained variance for individual factors (see tables 6, 7). These figures show the extent to which the dependent variables can be explained by independent variables. In other words, we will find out if measured attitudes are evenly spread throughout society or if they are specifically related to particular social groups. Factors concerning causes of wealth show that in all three Western countries, the percentage of explained variance is the highest in the system wealth factor. Social determination of perception of wealth in post-communist countries differs. In 1991, the $R^2$ of the structural wealth factor was highest in Hungary and Russia. In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, the percentage of explained variance was the highest in the individual wealth factor. In 1996, the situation changed.

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11 In a series of regression equations, the original latent variables were converted to variables that can enter further analyses using factor scores regression (calculated by the LISREL software).
significantly. In the Czech Republic, system explanation of wealth became the most socially heterogeneous attitude while in Hungary the individual explanation of wealth became less widespread in the society.

In general, the social capital factor depended on stratification variables the least. Percentages of explained variance of this factor were rather low in all countries and its determination varied as well. The only effect that works in a similar manner in all countries is the effect of equal opportunities. A feeling of equal opportunities logically decreases the belief in specific advantages of selected social groups in accumulating wealth. There are hardly any other statistically significant effects impacting on the social capital factor. For the most part, these involve exceptions that do not hold consistently in all societies.

The way individual and structural attitudes to wealth are determined is much more consistent in all countries. The regression analysis showed a strong support for the underdog hypothesis. I found that the higher the income (in the United States), education (in the Netherlands, in the US, in Russia 1991, and in the Czech Republic 1991) and subjective status (Western Germany, Hungary 1991 & 1996 and Russia 1996), the weaker the tendency to believe in structural explanation of wealth. On the other hand, the longer the unemployment period (Germany and the Netherlands) and the higher the deprivation (in the Netherlands, US, Russia in 1991 and 1996, and Czech Republic in 1991 and 1996), the stronger the tendency to explain wealth by structural causes. Structural perception of wealth also relates to the belief in equal opportunities. The more one believes in equal opportunities, the lower the tendency to attribute wealth to structural causes. Surprisingly, Western Germany was the only country to show the opposite relationship.

The regression model of the individual explanation of wealth also supports the underdog hypothesis. Individual explanation of wealth becomes stronger as income rises (in the United States and Russia in 1991 while in Germany the trend was opposite!) and subjective status increases (Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary in 1991 and 1996 and Czech Republic in 1991). On the other hand, rising deprivation decreases individual explanations. Furthermore, there is a strong relationship to the feeling of having equal opportunities. The more people believe in equal opportunities, the more they support individual explanation of inequalities. Equal opportunities appear crucial both for adopting and refusing the dominant ideology.

Regression equations showed legitimacy of wealth is an important political issue. In general, going from the left to the right, the likelihood of structural explanation diminishes while the likelihood of individual explanation rises. The relationship between political orientation and perceptions of wealth in Central Europe should also be noted. In 1991, there was a negative correlation between structural explanations of wealth and political orientation in Hungary whereas this relationship was statistically insignificant in the Czech Republic and Russia. In 1996, a negative correlation appeared in the Czech Republic while it disappeared in Hungary. In 1996 the liberal-conservative coalition was still in power in the Czech Republic and Social-Democratic opposition made social inequalities one of the crucial items on its political agenda. Attitudes to inequalities in the Czech Republic were coming to resemble those in Western countries. By 1996, the political pendulum took a swing to the left in Hungary and the post-
3. Analysis

Communistic government turned out more right-oriented than its liberal-conservative predecessor. Thus, leftist and rightist orientations and attitudes to inequalities were less crystallized in Hungary. A rising correlation between left-right scale and individual wealth factor also reveals the crystallization of the left-right axis in the Czech Republic (cf. Vlachova & Mateju 1998; Vlachova 1998, 1999).

When analyzing perceptions of wealth, I did not find any support for the enlightenment hypothesis (Robinson, Bell 1978; Szirmai 1986). Regression equation either showed no effect of education or status effect of schooling prevailed. Education led to a decrease in likelihood to choose the system explanation of wealth (in the Netherlands, United States, Russia in 1991 and Czech Republic 1991) but did not impact on perception of individual causes. The relationship between education and social capital factor was inconsistent. While the belief in social capital increased with education in the Czech Republic in 1996, it decreased in the Netherlands. There were no statistically significant effects in other countries.

Similarly, the Zeitgeist effect did not occur with perception of wealth. The inclination to system explanation diminishes and inclination to individual explanation rises with age in Germany but the system explanation increases and individual explanation decreases with age in the Netherlands. There was a positive relationship between age and system explanation in Russia in 1996 and Czech Republic in 1991 as well. This relationship was predicted in the theoretical perspectives as values of older people should more strongly reflect their experience with the communist ideology. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear why the effects in Russia and Czech Republic were not identical in both years.

3.4.2. Poverty

The structural explanation enjoys the least homogenous social support of all poverty perception factors (Table 6). The $R^2$ of the structural factor ranges from 0.07 (Russia in 1991) to 0.17 (Hungary in 1991). Except for the Netherlands, these values exceed values of other factors in all countries. Explained variance of the individual factor ranges from 0.04 (Hungary in 1996) to 0.18 (the Netherlands). Factor of fatal poverty has the lowest percentage of explained variance, ranging from 0.01 (Czech Republic in 1991) to 0.06 (the Netherlands, United States and Hungary in 1996).

Belief in equal opportunities plays a crucial role in legitimization of poverty. The relationship between equal opportunities and rising inclination to individual explanation and decreasing inclination to system explanation is rather widespread. The hypothesis stating that the belief in equal opportunities is crucial for dominant stratification ideology was confirmed again. The relationship between equal opportunities and fatal poverty is less clear. As the table shows, regression coefficients are, for the most part, insignificant and statistically significant coefficients are not consistent. While the relationship between equal opportunities and inclination to fatalistic explanation of poverty is negative in the United States, it is positive in Hungary and the Czech Republic.

In compliance with theory, structural explanations of poverty are much more related to political preferences than individual explanations. People of different political beliefs
share individualism (except for the United States and Czech Republic in 1991 where individual explanation rises going left to right). Structuralism becomes stronger as the political preferences move to the left. This means that poverty due to structural causes has indeed become an important political issue which shapes differences between right- and left-oriented parties. This finding also confirms a group effect on attitudes and opinions. In this very case, the more left-oriented one is, the more likely one is to agree with the system explanation of poverty. Political socialization associated with alternative values (among members and supporters of parties) offers a potential explanation. Also, the information effect due to following media with different political orientation should not be disregarded.

Factors of poverty perception offer an extensive empirical support for the underdog hypothesis. I found out that the structural explanation of poverty is stronger among women (in Germany, the Netherlands and Russia), low-income households (Hungary in 1991 and Russia in 1991), people with lower subjective status (Hungary in 1991 and 1996, Russia in 1996 and Czech Republic in 1991 and 1996). I also observed that structural explanations of poverty increase with relative deprivation (the Netherlands, the United States, Russia in 1996 and Czech Republic in 1991) and the length of unemployment (the Netherlands and Czech Republic in 1996). Individualism rises with family income (the United States and Russia in 1991) and subjective status (Hungary in 1991, Russia in 1996 and Czech Republic in 1991).

The enlightenment effect of education on perception of poverty causes is rather low. Surprisingly, education does not impact on the factor of structural causes of poverty. However, individual explanation decreased with rising education in the Netherlands and United States. In these two countries, the enlightenment effects resulted in a more skeptical attitude to individualism rather than in rising awareness of structural causes of poverty. It should also be noted that both in the United States and the Netherlands (and Russia in 1996), higher education made the belief in fatal causes of poverty less likely. This tendency contradicts our hypothesis stating that the most educated people will most strongly reflect the ongoing discussions on family environment and poverty risks.
### Table 6  OLS regression of structural, individual and fatalistic poverty (metric coefficients and significance levels α).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.032**</td>
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<td>-0.004</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relative Deprivation</strong></td>
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Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
### Table 6 (continuation)

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Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
### Table 6 (continuation)

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Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
Table 7  OLS regression of structural, individual, and social explanations of wealth (metric coefficients and significance levels α).

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Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
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<td>1.70***</td>
<td>1.17***</td>
<td>1.69***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
### Table 7 (continuation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Hungary 91</th>
<th>Hungary 96</th>
<th>Russia 91</th>
<th>Russia 96</th>
<th>Czech 91</th>
<th>Czech 96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.035*</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (standardized)</td>
<td>-0.035*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.003*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.016**</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective status</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.017*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Deprivation</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.035*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.013**</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Chances</td>
<td>-0.035**</td>
<td>-0.045***</td>
<td>-0.060***</td>
<td>-0.098***</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.021*</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.05***</td>
<td>1.69***</td>
<td>2.17***</td>
<td>2.71***</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>1.91***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R^2 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08

Note: * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper explored the ways in which people explain poverty and wealth. Causes of inequalities were analyzed particularly with regards to dominant stratification ideology and potential challenging beliefs. The analysis confirmed hypotheses based on the split-consciousness theory that states that structural and individual explanations of poverty are not mutually exclusive. On the individual level strengthening individual explanations do not necessarily weaken structural explanations and vice versa. The analysis went beyond the individual versus structural dichotomy. I showed that causes of poverty and wealth are structured on the basis of three rather than two independent factors. In addition to individual (loose morals and a lack of effort) and system (poor system, unequal opportunities and discrimination) explanations, people also believe in fatalistic poverty (bad luck and a lack of talents). Similarly, it is not possible to fully explain wealth by individual (abilities and hard work) and structural (poor system allowing for unfair profits) causes. Wealth due to social capital (contacts and unequal opportunities) does not fit in this dichotomy.

The role attributed to social capital in wealth accumulation should be discussed in more detail for several reasons. First, the dual character of social capital needs to be mentioned. Contacts are related not only to the factors of social capital and unequal opportunities but also to the individual factor even through the relationship may not be that strong (table 5). People appear to believe that social capital can be gained by being born in a particular environment as well as developed by establishing and nurturing personal contacts. Second, contacts were the most frequent cause of wealth mentioned in all countries. In fact, connections were emphasized more frequently than constitutive features of the individualistic dominant ideology even in Western countries. Third, the belief in social capital cuts across all social groups. The “social capital” factor was most socially homogenous in Germany, Czech Republic, Russia and Hungary in 1996 while the individualistic factor achieved the same position only in the United States, the Netherlands and Hungary in 1991.

All of the three above mentioned findings cast some doubt on the dominant ideology theory. While individualism dominates over the system explanation regarding wealth, connections and cronism play an important role as well. Is it possible to defend the theory of a “dominant stratification ideology”? Is the dominant ideology really “dominant”? Are there other factors at play? Evidence from the post-communist countries to some extent confirms the dominant ideology theory particularly in two respects. Two years after the fall of communist regimes, a rather strong Marxist interpretation of wealth persisted in Central and Eastern Europe, reflecting the ideology of old communist elites. The effect of elites could also allow us to explain the gradual rise in legitimacy of wealth. Russia and particularly the Czech Republic experienced strengthening individual causes of wealth from 1991 till 1995. The Czech experience is however questionable given the development we observed between 1996 and 1998. I mentioned the development on the Czech political scene to explain the post 1996 change. It appears that the dominant ideology thesis doesn’t acknowledge the possibility of internal splits within political elites. In some circumstances a part of the elite may undermine the dominant ideology in order to challenge effectively current government.
4. Conclusion

Deriving attitudes from personal social position turned out to be a fruitful analytical approach. In spite of some differences between countries, I can conclude that the higher the social status, the lower the inclination to the structural explanation of inequalities and the higher the individual explanation. In accordance with the dominant and challenging ideologies, social status has a stronger impact on the structural explanation of poverty and wealth. In several cases, however, I discovered an opposite effect compared to the one suggested by the underdog hypothesis. In Germany, unemployment turned out to have a positive effect on individual explanation of poverty while income had a negative effect on individual explanation of wealth.

As the enlightenment theory claims, in addition to a status effect, education also has a limited enlightenment effect. However, education played the enlightenment role only in Western countries. The more educated were less convinced that poverty is caused by negative personal traits of the poor. A decline in individualism was not associated with an anticipated increase in fatalistic or structural poverty. In post-communist countries, the effect of education on attitudes to inequality was rather limited. When the effect did appear, the stratification impact overruled the enlightenment one.

Development in Central and Eastern Europe had a significant impact on legitimacy of inequalities. Attitudes to poverty and wealth differ here substantially from those in Western countries. However, it was impossible to distinguish precisely impacts of the socialistic past and ongoing transformation as the transformation had been in progress for two years by 1991. I can nevertheless conclude that legitimacy of inequalities in post-communist countries was much lower than in Western societies. The trend was rather negative as for the most part wealth was perceived in negative terms.

A relatively higher legitimacy of poverty in the post-communist societies may be due to combined previous and current dominant ideologies. During socialism as well as after its collapse, the elite is interested in supporting negative individualistic explanations of poverty. However, we again face the limits of the “dominant stratification ideology”. A strong emphasis on structural causes of poverty shows that the ability of the elite in pushing its ideology was probably rather limited even under the post-communist circumstances. In fact, individualism did not prevail in Western countries either, as all causes of poverty were balanced (see Table 1).

As the perceptions of inequalities were rather negative in the post-communist countries, this does not necessarily lead to an increase in potential for political action. Dissatisfaction with the stratification system is a potential hot political issue for a wide range of parties and movements. However, political actors are more probable to take advantage of cumulated dissatisfaction if it is concentrated in clearly defined segments of population. As noted above, however, system explanations gained wider social support (increasing $R^2$ in regression equation- tables 6, 7) only in the Czech Republic (the structural wealth factor went up from 0.09 to 0.18 and structural poverty factor increased from 0.08 to 0.17). In Russia, explained variation of both structural wealth and poverty increased only slightly (from 0.09 to 0.12 and from 0.07 to 0.09, respectively). In Hungary, on the other hand, the relationship between structural factors and other variables was diminishing (from 0.11 to 0.09 with wealth and from 0.17 to 0.09 with poverty). In the Czech Republic, criticizing unjust wealth and poverty
also became a crucial issue for the left-oriented opposition and appears to have significantly contributed to its electoral successes (cf. Kreidl 1998; Matějů 1999b).

Subjective stratification played a more important role in determining attitudes in post-communist countries while the impacts of income, education and gender were less apparent. Statistically significant effect of the subjective status in post-communist countries occurred in more than half of the cases (19 out of 36 - tables 6, 7) while the percentage amounted to mere 28% in Western countries (5 cases out of 18). As far as income is concerned, the effect was statistically significant only in 14% of cases in Eastern countries (5 out of 36) while 28% cases were significant in Western societies (5 out of 18) (see Tables 6 and 7). This phenomenon may be attributed to the originally rather low-income differentiation in post-communist societies (Milanovic 1998). The general theory of legitimacy of inequalities states that during periods involving radical social changes, legitimacy derives from collective rather than individual mobility (Wesolowski, Mach 1986a, 1986b). Therefore, the subjective status may more accurately reflect one's opportunities than, for example, actual income. Nevertheless, relative deprivation and subjective social status remain some of the biggest challenges not only to legitimacy of the post-communist social structure but also to sociologists that do research on post-communist transformation.
5. REFERENCES


V další části článku pracuji s teoriemi, které vysvětlují vznik různých názorů na původ chudoby a bohatství. Ukazují jak legitimita nerovnosti závisí na individuální stratifikační zkušenosti, skupinové identifikaci, vzdělání a sociální atmosféře. Podpora různých teorií ale není jednoznačná. Hypotéza o závislosti legitimity nerovnosti na individuální a kolektivní stratifikační zkušenosti získala mezi všemi teoriemi nejsilnější podporu. Naopak hypotéza o osvíceneckém vlivu vzdělání (původně odvozená z výzvoje ve Spojených státech) má pravděpodobně jen velmi omezenou platnost. Test hypotézy o vlivu sociální atmosféry je ponekud komplikován křížením vlivů generace, doby a věku a je jen obtížné dopředu k jednoznačnému závěru.

V závěru jsou diskutovány silné a slabé stránky teorie dominantní stratifikační ideologie, teorie o konkurečních normách a teorie o rozdvojeném vědomí. Analýza ukázala, že percepcie nerovnosti je ponekud komplikována, než tyto teorie předpokládají. To se týká jak dominance "dominantní ideologie", tak rozdvojenosti "rozdvojeného vědomí". Na druhé straně vývoj v postkomunistických zemích ukázal setrvačnost komunistické dominantní stratifikační ideologie a jisté úspěchy v budování nového individualismu. Teorie dominantní stratifikační ideologie rovněž nevysvětluje nejednotnost elit ve vztahu k legitimité nerovnosti a nevysvětlí, proč se interpretace nerovnosti může stát předmětem politického diskurzu, tak jak se tomu stalo v některých postkomunistických zemích. Na druhou stranu je zřejmé, že sociální zkušenost má
SUMMARY

This paper analyzes legitimacy of poverty and wealth in six countries. In the first part various theories about perceptions of poverty and wealth are presented. Most sociologists have been elaborating the theory of dominant and challenging stratification ideology so far. Dominant stratification ideology is promoted by conscious legitimacy-supporting behavior of the elite and operates with individual explanations of inequalities. Dominant stratification ideology should be shared by virtually all members of society. This notion is then complemented by a notion of challenging beliefs stemming from personal stratification-related experience. Negative social experience (unemployment, economic insecurity, etc.) as well as influential socializing groups (unions, liberal political parties) make their contribution to structural explanations. Split-consciousness theory then predicts that both individual and structural perception can coexist at individual level.

Based on some previous research I argue, however, that the latent structure of perceptions of poverty and wealth is more complex. Using data from International Social Justice Project I found that people distinguish between merited, unmerited and fatalistic types of poverty. Merited poverty corresponds to what researchers usually call “individualistic explanation” (e.g. loose morals, a lack of effort), unmerited poverty is due to discrimination, failure of the economic system, and lack of equal opportunities (so called structural causes), and fatalistic explanation operates with bad luck and lack of ability and talents. Moreover, people structure their explanations of wealth along three factors too. Wealth can be merited, unmerited, or based on social capital. Positive individual explanation attributes wealth to hard work, ability and good luck. Unmerited wealth is a purely negative explanation (dishonesty and failure of the economic system) and social capital sees contacts, unequal opportunities and good luck as reasons of wealth.

Further, I elaborate theories about determinants of perceptions of inequalities. I show how legitimacy of inequalities depends on individual stratification-related experience, group identification and membership, education and changing social atmosphere. Empirical support for those theories is not unambiguous. It turned out that relating legitimacy to individual and collective stratification experience is a fruitful approach. On the other hand the enlightenment effect of education is hard to generalize beyond the US where it was originally developed. Social atmosphere effects are hard to detect because of the confusion of age, generation and period effects.

Final section of the paper discusses strengths and weaknesses of dominant stratification thesis, challenging beliefs and split-consciousness theory. First of all, the analysis demonstrated that perception of inequalities is much more complicated than has been assumed so far. Dominant beliefs are less dominant than it is usually theorized and split-consciousness is by no means perfectly split. There is some positive evidence. In post-communist societies we observed certain inertia of the old communist ideology, and also some successes in making up new individualism.
Dominant stratification thesis fails to explain struggle over legitimacy of inequalities that might occur within political elite. It fails to acknowledge that poverty and wealth might be brought into political discourse and that their legitimacy might be openly questioned. Analysis of post-communist countries thus calls for reconsideration of the dominant ideology thesis. Moreover, post-communist experience also leads to a higher appreciation of individual stratification-related experience. Economic development after the fall of communism heavily undermined the legitimacy of inequalities. The East-West differential impact of absolute and relative deprivation is also worth emphasizing.

**ZUSAMMENFASUNG**


Beachtenswert ist gleichfalls der Unterschied zwischen den postkommunistischen und den westlichen Ländern beim Einfluss der absoluten sowie relativen Deprivation auf die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Ungleichheiten.
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